

**A Structural Explanation of State Fragility:
Theorizing the Causal Pathways**

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Abstract

Any global structure comprises of ideational and material elements. To put the idea into practice, members of the global community formulate rules and regulations and marshal resources to build capacities and institutions that can affect states and societies. Although the effects of the global structures on the state fragility are increasingly being recognized, the pathways through which they can affect the states contributing to its fragility or strengthening its resilience have been rarely examined. This paper aims at filling the void in the literature by offering a structural explanation of state fragility. The post 9/11 structure of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOt) has been taken as a proxy to theorize the pathways. It argues that the ideational and material factors of the GWOt operate through: (i) the cognitive pathway shaping the states' thinking, interpreting and reasoning process (ii) the regulatory pathway creating demand for policy coordination, cooperation and compatible legal and procedural instruments for counter terrorism (CT) and their compliance (iii) the capability pathway shaping the states' coercive capability, institutions and CT alliance building. The theorized pathways are illustrated through schematic diagrams showing how they can impact the states' legitimacy and capacity dimensions contributing to the increase or decrease of the state fragility to facilitate their tracing in individual case studies. Finally, the paper makes comparative

analysis of the cognitive, regulatory and capability pathways highlighting their relationship and relative significance.

Keywords: State Fragility; Global Structure; Global War on Terrorism; Fragile States

Introduction

‘[V]ery frequently the “world images” that have been created by “ideas” have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest’

(Weber, cited in Eastwood, 2005: 90)

The declaration of the ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWOt) fundamentally altered the post-modern history and ushered in a new framing of terrorism and a renewed demand for a global response to terrorism, in general, and international terrorism, in particular.¹ Although concerns over the use of terrorism as a means of achieving a political goal were raised much before the 9/11, efforts to build a global structure to fight terrorism remained scanty (Roach, 2011; Byers, 2002).² Implicit to this global structure was the need to define the underpinning rules, regulations and norms to fight terrorism, connecting the global to the local.³ Consequently, the discourse of GWOt became a novel interpretive tool for the states and societies to define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgements and suggest remedies.⁴ The discourse continues to offer a powerful organizing principle, shaping the choices and actions of the states, particularly because the fragile states, because of their unique position in the international system.

The fragile states, arguably even more so than other states, remains subject to the ideational and material influences of the dominant global actors. The margins drawn by these actors regarding rules, norms and practices together with the provisions to provide incentives or impose penalties compels the fragile states

to act in certain ways to survive and prosper (Sorenson, 2008:8). The structure of the GWOt emerged through a process in which the powerful actors, operating through the UNSC, defined the rules, norms and practices to fight terrorism. However, the persistent influence of global ideational and material factors to shape the state’s preferences and actions is not a straightforward issue. The weak institutional capacity, corruption, contested legitimacy, legacies of high inequality, violence and instability enables such global ideational and material factors to mutate and multiply in fragile conditions producing unexpected consequences and unanticipated trade-offs. Such links between the structure of the GWOt and its ability to produce unintended consequences, like the fragmentation of state-society relation, human rights abuse, violation of sovereignty norm, adoption of lesser evil doctrine is rarely examined in the debate on fragile states.

The Ideational and Material Factors of GWOt

Ideas are defined as “subjective claims about descriptions of the world”, the “causal relationships” based on which the actors claim the “normative legitimacy of certain actions” (Parsons, 2002:48). An idea empowers the actor(s) through the discourse and becomes a reality only through the actor’s ability “to intervene in the real world or to refrain from such intervention, with the effect of influencing a specific process or the state of affairs” (Giddens, 1984:14). The ideas define the meaning and the purpose of the material power (i.e. capability); hence they are the ‘starting point’ to interpret the social world. Ideational forces work through a process of interaction and learning, facilitated by global and local institutions and agencies, influencing the states’ identities and interests (Wendt, 1992:394). Central to the process is the production and reproduction of shared knowledge. Such knowledge is transmitted through interactions of the states and their societies shaping our cognitive domain and developing a mutual and equal sense of supporting an issue, act or agenda,


especially from the perspective of the policy elites in a country and the citizens in general.⁵ The process of such collective learning and cognitive evolution helps to institutionalize the knowledge, practices and discourses. It is in these senses that we need to view the ideational factors of the GWOt and how they become relevant and a novel interpretive tool for the regimes in the fragile states and their societies to assess its impact. However, the cognitive domain of a global structure does not exist in a material vacuum.⁶ The material capabilities along with the ideas and institutions constitute the context within which the actions by the states or any other actors take place. The material factors, particularly the state's coercive capabilities, are crucial for its behavior (Waltz, 2000; Mearsheimer, 1994). The structure of the GWOt has an overwhelming focus on state's coercive capacity building that can affect the power balance, not just between the states, but also within the state. In sum, the ideational and material factors of the GWOt contributes to the production of a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, organizational plans, energies and material commitments for the war on terror which limits and constitutes the conduct of the states and its societies. But how can we dissect the ideational and material factors of the GWOt to theorize their causal pathways?

The Cognitive, Regulatory and Capability Domain of the GWOt

Drawing clear distinction between ideational and material factors is difficult. The ideational factors are intersubjective and can bring change in state-society's behavior in combination with the material factors (Wendt, 1999:114; Jacobs, 2015; Weber, cited in Eastwood, 2005:90). Sorensen (2008:14) divides the global ideational and material factors in terms of power and norms (i.e. economic power, political-military power, and international norms) while Cox's (1996:98) conceptualization of the 'historical structure' is a combination that brings together thought, material

conditions and institutions. We argue that the structure of the GWOt has cognitive, regulatory and capability domains, and each domain operates through a distinct pathway that can contribute to the increase or decrease of state fragility (See figure 1).

Figure 1: Three Domains of the Ideational and Material factors of GWOt



First, the production and reproduction of knowledge to reinforce the framing of the GWOt and the norm of socialization process shape our cognitive domain. It generates new meanings of terrorism and how the states and societies should understand and interpret terrorism. Second, the global norms and practices to fight terrorism shape the regulatory domain suggesting the states to (re)act in a certain way; it defines the boundaries within which the states must act to fight the war on terror. Third, the material factors of the GWOt and the corresponding focus on enhancing the coercive capability of the states shape the capability domain, defining the use of coercive forces. Together they become a unique and interdependent global structure affecting fragile states.⁷ The domains in question operate through their respective pathways discussed below.

Theorizing the Effects of the Cognitive Pathway of GWOt

The cognitive pathway refers to the underlying mental processes people use to make sense of information. It generates meaning, involving three interdependent processes: first, comparative thinking that processes information by identifying how bits of data are alike and/or different; second, a symbolic representation process that helps to transform information into culturally acceptable coding systems, and finally a reasoning process that uses the abstract thinking strategies to systematically process information to generate meaning. In short, the cognitive pathway involves a *thinking-interpreting-reasoning* process.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks changed the thinking-interpreting-reasoning process in a way that privileges a consequentialist approach. The attack was more akin to an act of war, traditionally understood in the West as a continuation of policy by other means by the state actors. But the attackers in the present case were non-state actors, demanding a radically different world order based on the transcendental truths, grounded in their misinterpretation of Islam (Behnke and Hellmich, 2012:2-6). The attack also reflected a complete indifference to human cost. The terrorists' aim of seeking nothing but a violent transformation of an "irremediably sinful and unjust world" through the means that are indifference to human cost, is incompatible with the political reality that considers the threat of death as the ultimate sanction for maintaining political order. Consequently, the states and societies in the post 9/11 era are confronted with the dilemma of whether or not terrorism can have any justification whatsoever.⁸

Such a context privileges a consequentialist approach over the deontological approach in the fight against terrorism (See table 1). The consequentialist motivation of the GWOt invokes the idea of performing what is 'most good' – the end that benefits 'the most' justifies the means (Alexander and Moore, 2016; Cox, Levin and Newman, 2009). This results in choosing a path of, according to

Ignatieff (2004:18), 'lesser evil'. However, in the context of GWOt, the lesser evil doctrine tends to view the act of terrorism performed by non-state actors as pure evil and accords greater margin for the state to use force against such actors.⁹ Such measures culminate in framing the GWOt as 'us' versus 'them' - facilitating the states to claim normative legitimacy in this global war.¹⁰


Table 1: Farming the GWOt: deontological versus consequentialist approach

	Deontological Approach	Consequentialist Approach
<i>Motivation</i>	To perform what is intrinsically right. The means must be 'right' to achieve an end.	To perform what is 'most good'. The end that benefits the most justifies the means.
<i>Ethical & Moral Focus</i>	Ethical conduct involves always doing the right thing: never failing to do one's duty. Seeks to achieve moral consistency.	Ethical conduct is the action that will achieve the best consequences. Seeks to achieve moral balancing.
<i>View or terrorists</i>	No scope to take a position on 'terrorist'. Focuses only on 'act' and own 'duty' to implement rules.	Offers scope to define the 'terrorists'. Promotes 'outcome based' rules.
<i>Nature of rules promoted</i>	Regulative and constitutive rules, norms and practices that frame taking 'right' actions by all actors.	Regulative and constitutive rules, norms and practices based on consequential consideration, influenced/favoring the dominant actors and or majority.

	Deontological Approach	Consequentialist Approach
<i>Justice and right</i>	Considerations of justice override considerations about consequences and a person's inviolability rights cannot be trumped by considerations of utility.	Choice of 'best' consequences can triumph individual rights and inviolability claims.
<i>View or terrorists</i>	Rigid and impersonal. Offers no insight to proceed when facing a situation in which two or more duties conflict.	Flexible and pragmatic. Conflicting priorities are resolved in utilitarian terms. Considers heinous actions may also bring a good outcome for the majority, hence ethical.
<i>Outcome</i>	Liberal values are protected without being tainted.	Liberal values risks being trained and colored.


The cognitive pathway of the GWoT imbues a culture of fear and 'othering' and works as an echo chamber for the states and societies. Before 9/11, the accepted global norm for applying instruments like Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was aimed at creating a consensus around the right to intervene only when the states were not fulfilling their obligations to protect their citizens (UK Parliament 2013; ICISS, 2001). However, the GWoT brought a new focus to identify the 'states at risk', promoting a doctrine of unilateral pre-emption that undermines the long-held sovereignty doctrine.¹¹ The shift in the strategic cultures is based on painting the fragile states as an exporter of vices and the urgency of taking pre-emptive actions to prevent the vices from reaching the stable and wealthy western states having little or no regards to the underlying causes of fragility (Iyengar, 2015).

The cognitive pathway also brings back the state as the central player ignoring the society- focused approaches of development.¹² It allows overlooking the fact that the state itself can be a source of the fragility. The regime can adopt and use the 'us' versus 'them' narrative of the GWoT in the domestic context and embark on discrediting groups that are at variance with the regime's ideology and rule as 'terrorist'. Several deeply rooted conflicts in different countries and territories, such as, Chechnya, Myanmar, Mali, Uzbekistan, Kashmir, Philippines, Palestine and some parts of Syria have been redefined and repackaged by the state actors using the discourse of the GWoT (HRW, 2012: 6). In post-conflict fragile states, this may also lead to exclusion of domestically legitimate important actors out of peace agreements, increasing the chances to relapse into conflict.¹³ Since 9/11, the international actors have, indeed, increasingly perceived all the non-state armed groups as 'terrorist organizations' (OECD, 2012: 42). The framing of the GWoT allows the states to adopt a broad and vague definition of terrorism. As a result, it empowers the states to not only to curb legitimate dissent, but also to selectively apply the state's coercive power against political oppositions, leading to the increased societal violence. The post 9/11 global trend in political terror (PTS) and societal violence (Centre for Systemic Peace) provide evidence to that effect.



Source: Author's compilation from Gibney et al. (2016)

Figure 2 plots the trend in political terror as measured by PTS for the period 2001-2015.¹⁴ Since 2001, there has been a steady increase globally in the percentage of countries with a PTS score of 3 and above. The percentage of fragile states that are traditionally fraught with political terror has also increased during the period except in 2011. Figure 3 plots a more nuanced picture of political terror in the context of 55 fragile states. The increase in extreme political terror (i.e. score 5) in the context of the fragile states had jumped from 13 per cent in 2001 to 25.5 per cent in 2011 and had stabilized around 20 per cent of countries in 2015. This evidence tends to suggest that the discourse of the GWoT has empowered the states to abuse their coercive means terrorizing its population including curbing political freedom in the fragile states.¹⁵




Source: Author's compilation from Gibney et al. (2016).


Similarly, the global trend of societal violence as recorded by the Centre for Systemic Peace in summed magnitudes¹⁶ of all Major Episode of Political Violence (societal MEPV)¹⁷ provides broad evidence relating to the effects of the cognitive pathway. Figure 4 shows that the global trend (2001-2016) of societal violence had a little increase¹⁸ while the fragile states experienced most of the violence reaching 47.3 per cent of the states in 2015.

Figure 5 provides a more nuanced picture of the fragile states' societal violence by disaggregating the summed magnitudes into

its corresponding scales. It shows that the extreme form of societal violence (i.e. magnitude 7- 10) has remained stable.¹⁹ However, societal violence in the magnitude of 6 and above has increased in the fragile states, indicating damage and distortions of social networks, increased area and scope of death and destruction, population displacement, environmental degradation, damage and resource diversion.



Source: Author's compilation from Marshall (2017)




Source: Author's compilation from Marshall (2017)

The discussions lead us to draw how the cognitive pathway of the GWoT impacts the fragile states (figure 6). At the heart of this pathway lies a culture of fear and othering and a global echo chamber producing new norms and practices for the states and societies. The culture of fear and othering can manifest through identity politics, instilling a sense of insecurity, social fragmentation, violence and instability and thereby creating a fragile situation. This channel can directly reach societies without the need to mediate through the state institutions. Leveraging the modern communication facilities, it can trigger the othering process, reignite or strengthen identity-based politics and radicalization by exploiting local socio-political and economic cleavages. If the state takes a consequentialist approach to terrorism, the culture of fear and othering can mediate through the state institutions and produce similar consequences at the societal level contributing to more fragility. In contrast, the global echo chamber mediates through the state institutions to become causally effective.

The new strategic norms and practices empower the fragile states to fight not only terrorism, but also use its coercive power for achieving regime security, instead of national security, through exclusionary and selective practices. For the powerful states, it provides normative legitimacy to pre-emptive attack and intervention, regime change, sanctions, tighter border and immigration control. However, empowerment by the global echo chamber may or may not culminate in a fragile situation. The condition under which the fragile states may not slip into more fragility is when the state is prudent in the application of its coercive means, or the opposition/right group/civil society is weak or lacks support to challenge the authority. In sum, the cognitive pathway shapes the process of thinking-interpreting-reasoning at the global level that mediates through the states institutions and penetrates the society leading to the increase or decrease of state fragility. The cognitive pathway sets the foundation to formulate the regulatory pathway of the GWoT, which is being examined below.

Figure 6: The Cognitive Pathway of GWoT




Theorizing the Effects of the Regulatory Pathway of GWoT

The regulatory pathway of the GWoT is a logical extension of the cognitive pathway to make the fight against terrorism actionable by the states. It consists of voluntary and binding instruments, such as conventions, protocols, resolutions, laws and procedures for the states to fight terrorism. The influential global and regional actors help to formulate and sustain the regulatory framework that stabilizes and perpetuates the 'meaning' of the discourse of the GWoT, in general, and terrorism, in particular.

Considering the broad array of instruments, we focus on the UN-based core documents that lie at the heart of the CT regulatory regime. There are 12 UN CT conventions and seven protocols that criminalize certain specific acts of terrorism. Once ratified by the states, these instruments provide a legal framework for multilateral actions.²⁰ It is worth noting that out of 12 CT conventions, only two were introduced after 9/11.²¹ Despite being available for the ratification for long, majority of the states remained reluctant, and the trend of the ratification of the CT instruments declined before 9/11. However, the event of 9/11 resulted in speedy ratifications of these instruments, marking a global convergence on the CT legislation.²² Figure 7 documents the ratification trend of the ten pre-9/11 conventions on a scale of three years interval.²³ As evident, ratification of all the conventions except three had a sudden increase after 9/11. The declining trend of ratifying the convention on diplomatic agent and hostage, introduced in 1973 and 1979 respectively, also increased after 9/11. The new conventions on terrorist financing (1999), bombing (1997), plastic explosive (1991), were also quickly ratified by the states after 9/11.

The post 9/11 ‘mind’ of the state actors becomes much more apparent when the trend of the CT instruments ratification is compared with the trend of the ratification of the UN Human Rights (HR) instruments introduced during the same period (Figure 8).²⁴ The HR ratification trend reached its peak during 1990-1995, coinciding with the second wave of democratization: before 9/11, there were 1,213 ratifications of the ten HR instruments compared to 941 ratifications of the ten CT instruments. However, within the three years of 9/11 attacks, the CT conventions ratification trend was 3.20 times higher compared to that of the HR. By 2017, the total ratification of the CT conventions reached 1733 compared to 1549 for the HR conventions. A disaggregated comparison of the ratification speed (see figure 9) for each convention illustrates the demand for regulatory convergence on the CT after 9/11. The regulatory




Source: Author's compilation from the UN Treaty Collection Database

pathway of the GWoT converged and consolidated only after the event of 9/11 – buttressed by the actions of two UN bodies - the UNGA & the UNSC.

Between September 2001 and July 2017, the UNGA passed 57 resolutions relating to terrorism as opposed to only 24, passed between 1972 and September 2001. The UNGA also adopted the Global CT strategy, stressing on the human rights and the rule of law in the fight against terrorism.²⁵ However, analyzing the texts of pre- and post-9/11 resolutions on terrorism provides important insights. The 1972 UNGA Resolution (A/RES/3034(XXVII)) on ‘Measures to Prevent International Terrorism’ expressed that the Assembly is ‘deeply perturbed’ and ‘concerned’ over increasing frequency of terrorism and its effects; and at the same time, it also

reaffirmed ‘the inalienable rights of self-determination and independence of all people’ and explicitly upheld the ‘the legitimacy of their struggle, in particular, the struggle for national liberation movement (p.119).’ In 1988, such expressions in the UNGA resolutions changed, and by 1995, the mention of the ‘inalienable rights of self-determination’ and conferring ‘legitimacy’ to the national liberation movement were dropped (A/RES/49/60).²⁶ Instead, the resolutions held the view that the act of terrorism is ‘unjustifiable’ in any circumstances, regardless of the ‘considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature’ (A/RES/49/60, p.4, A/RES/54/110).




Source: Author's compilation from the UN Treaty Collection database (for CT ratification data) and UN Office of Legal Affairs (for HR ratification data).

Between September 2001 and July 2017, the UNSC adopted 41 resolutions²⁷, expressing “strong and unequivocal” condemnation of terrorism “in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever reasons.” By adopting the new resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,²⁸ the UNSC essentially started to legislate against terrorism and made the task of implementing executive action against terrorism a universal concern (Szasz 2002; Marschik, 2005; Krueger et al., 2008). The

U.N.-based regulatory regime came into fruition through the reporting regime introduced by resolution 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005).²⁹ Between 2001 and 2007, the member states have submitted 743 reports under the UNSC resolution 1373(2001) and 110 reports under the resolution 1624(2004).³⁰ The reports cover various issues including actions taken by the states against sanctioned entities/individuals as well as capacity building efforts/needs for the fight against terrorism.

Several sanctioning, monitoring and accountability regimes are also in place to facilitate the rule-consistent behavior by the states. Based on the UN sanction list, the member states are required to take punitive measures including arrest, asset freeze, ban on travel and restrictions. The origin and operating areas of all these sanctioned entities are in the fragile states,³¹ putting these states in focus for global security. The UNSC resolutions, together with the reporting regime, also allows to classify the fragile states into various stages, identify the entry point of assistance by external actors to empower the states’ legislative and executive machinery through a systematic process of capacity building. ³² Such a process fits into the larger scheme to ‘bring back the state’ as argued before. The CT norm socialization process through the UN-based instruments also resonates in the regional and sub-regional level, strengthening the regulatory pathway of the GWoT, potentially producing pernicious consequences in fragile states.

The consequences of the regulatory pathway of the GWoT in the context of fragile states can be inferred from several global surveys, periodic reports and assessments.³³ First, the regulatory pathway of the GWoT works as a stimulus to elevate terrorism as a national security threat.³⁴ Such elevation can be problematic in the fragile states where the notion of ‘national security’ is often conflated with the ‘regime security’. National definitions of terrorism often exceed the scope by alleging to harm national security or constitutional order, without further elaboration.



Source: Author's compilation

While the strategy of 'zero-tolerance on terrorism' is applauded by the external actor, a selective application of the CT law may exacerbate the already poor human rights conditions in fragile states in the name of fighting terrorism and divert the much-needed resources from providing core state services that lie


at the heart of state fragility. Second, the regulatory pathway encourages and assists the states to introduce/amend the CT legislations with a focus on preventive actions.³⁵ Before 9/11, approximately 51 countries had CT laws. However, since 9/11, more than 140 governments have passed CT legislations and revised existing criminal codes (HRW, 2012). The worldwide diffusion of the CT laws was either crisis-driven or in response to the pressure from powerful countries (HRW, 2012:3).³⁶ More importantly, criminalizing terrorist acts, using a preventive framework allows the law enforcing agencies to go 'fishing' for offences without full respect for several criminal law principles³⁷ and fair treatment, resulting in the human rights abuse. In particular, efforts to regulate cyberspace to counter violent extremism or stop recruitment by a terrorist organization are often selectively used against the journalists, opinion makers and media houses to stifle free speech (Human Rights Watch, 2012; Global Network Initiative, 2016). Third, despite the call for increasing cooperation, international judicial cooperation for extraditing and prosecuting terrorism-related offences to allow the due process remains slow (S/2016/49). The absence of such a formal mechanism partly contribute to the ad-hoc practices like extraordinary renditions and opening 'black sites.' In summary, the discourse of the GWoT has been quickly universalized through the U.N. creating binding regulations and voluntary implementation for the states. The regulatory pathway of the GWoT empower the states to enact laws, adopt strategies, implement measures and selectively apply those that can undermine human rights, ignore due process and prioritize the regime security over the national security, all of which contribute to the heightened state of fragility and fragmenting social cohesion. The lack of normative integration and mainstreaming of the closely related issues like human rights, civil liberties, conflict resolution and the rule of law, provide a permissive environment to use the regulative pathway of the GWoT as a tool to serve regime security, instead of national security, in the fragile states.

The analysis of the evidences leads us to arrive at the causal pathways of the regulatory domain as depicted in figure 11. There are two principal drivers at the global level: First, the emphasis on the ratification of the U.N. based conventions and resolutions contributes towards the creation of a demand for the fragile states not only to ratify those instruments, but also to reform/revise the domestic laws. This, in turn, can mutate in the fragile states to curb human rights, leading to increasing dissent, opposition and radicalization, contributing to more fragility. Second, the global demand for compliance and enforcement encourages the states to prioritize and elevate terrorism legislation as a national security threat, declaring zero-tolerance policy. This, in turn, could be applied selectively for regime security instead of national security and thereby contributing to an increased dissent, opposition and radicalization in society leading to decrease the legitimacy of the regime and increase the state fragility. However, if the opposition is weak, the state can achieve better social control and may not slip into more fragility. The regulatory domain of GVoT sets out the broad areas for material assistance for capacity building, which is being examined below.

Theorizing the Effects of the Capability Pathway of GVoT

The capability pathway involves material factors. It includes the protective and destructive measures and technologies as well as specialized forces and resources that a state needs or aspires to acquire. The process involves increased security spending to acquire CT assets, cooperation and assistance, border security and immigration control, induction of new institutions or elite forces to fight terrorism (Meyer and Strickmann, 2011:70). The capability pathways manifests through the exercise of coercion or threat of coercive actions (i.e. full-scale intervention to selective/surgical strikes using drones/ Special Forces, sanctions and proscriptions of groups, individuals and entities), and capacity building


Figure 11: The Regulatory Pathway of GVoT



assistance (i.e. security sector reform, aid, technical assistance, intelligence sharing, and building new CT alliance and institutions). Most fragile states are situated at the receiving end of such manifestations of the capability pathways, either as willing or unwilling/unable partners.

The front line fragile states that are unable and/or unwilling to participate in the GVoT may be subjected to direct coercive actions, often disregarding the sovereignty norms.³⁸ Apart from the U.S., countries like Israel, India, Kenya and Syria have also used coercive

force against their respective ‘unwilling’ neighbors in the name of fighting terrorism. The scope and nature of coercive action against the fragile states have gradually shifted from full-fledged invasion to surgical strikes using drone, Special Forces and the private security forces (The White House, 2013). Figure 12 documents the trend of U.S. drone strikes and associated casualties in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen between 2004 and 2017. These strikes were conducted with or without the consent of the host nations (Serle & Purkiss, 2016; Mueller et al., 2006).



Source: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (2017a)


The increasing use of drones and Special Forces to fight terrorism reflects the quest for adopting a ‘lesser evil’ doctrine inherent in the consequentialist approach as discussed. The ability to provide near-real-time video feeds, loiter and gather intelligence for long periods before a strike and the use of precision-guided munitions, is often cited as the positive advantage of the drone strikes from a humanitarian law perspective (A/68/389, p.7).³⁹ However, the legal ground for using drones, the processes of obtaining a states’

consent, transparency about the targeting and the civilian casualties due to drone attacks remain contested.⁴⁰ According to the 2014 Pew Research Centre survey (p.11) in Pakistan, 67 per cent of respondents opposed drone attacks.⁴¹ Several UN HRC Reports have also concluded that the use of drones in extraterritorial lethal CT operations violates the international laws (A/HRC/34/61, A/68/389, A/HRC/25/29).

For the willing participants of the GWoT, the capability pathway involves domestic resource mobilization and external assistance focused on the coercive capacity building. Figure 13 plots the trend of global and fragile states’ military expenditure⁴² and the U.S. military assistance⁴³ for the period between 1990 and 2015. It indicates that, despite a gradual decrease after 1990, resource mobilization towards coercive capacity building by all the states, in general, and the fragile states, in particular, started increasing after 2001. The annual growth rate of military expenditure by the fragile states increased from - 4 per cent between 1990 and 2001 to +7 per cent in the era of the GWoT (2002-2015).⁴⁴ The U.S. military assistance to the fragile states also increased by six percentage point for the same period of observation. Such an emphasis on the coercive capacity building in fragile states often comes at the expense of dispensing the provisions of other core services by the state resulting in its capacity deficits.

Leveraging the new capabilities and the demands created by the regulative and cognitive pathways of the GWoT, the fragile states’ approach to addressing its own (in)security dilemmas mutates in seeking and building unique bi-lateral and multi-lateral alliance. Three such examples of alliance building under the rubric of fighting terrorism are worth analyzing.

In 2015, Saudi Arabia ventured beyond the region to form the Islamic Military Alliance (IMA) to protect Muslim countries from all terrorist groups and terrorist organizations, irrespective of their sect and name.⁴⁵ However, regional neighbors like Iraq and Syria who are at the forefront of the CT fight were not invited,



presumably due to their alliance with the Shia dominated Iran.⁴⁶ Despite the supports of the U.S.A and the UK, the IMA remains susceptible to the sectarian and regional rivalries, reducing it as an exercise to draw legitimacy and isolate Iran. Following the 2017 IMA summit, Saudi Arabia, along with Egypt, Bahrain and the UAE imposed a blockade on Qatar, accusing the latter of supporting the terrorist entities in the region and put forward a 13-point demand to the Qatar authorities. Unsurprisingly, the number one demand was to scale down Qatar's diplomatic ties with Iran. Notwithstanding Qatar's alleged flirting with the terrorist groups, the Saudi action signified how the alliance building technique under the rubric of the GWOt triggers regional polarization and potential de-stabilizing situations.

The second example relates to the well-touted arrival of Russian troops (a traditional ally of India) in Pakistan (an arch rival of India), for the first time in September 2016 for a 'regular' exercise with an anti-terror focus.⁴⁷ The arrival of the Russian troops in Pakistan coincided with the heightened Indo-Pak tension, where India accused Pakistan for the attack in Uri and was in a diplomatic offensive to isolate Pakistan, including a refusal to attend the SAARC summit in Islamabad that was later postponed (Mohan 2016; Karim 2016). The ability to get the Russian troops in

Pakistani soil at a time of their choosing reflects how a state can exploit the CT cooperation framework secured through the capability pathway of the GWOt. Such alliance building under the rubric of the GWOt can contribute to amplification of enmity, instead of resolving it, feeding state fragility.

Third, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) undertook the SSR programs for combating terrorism in several authoritarian states in Central Asia (OSCE, 2001).⁴⁸ However, most SSR initiatives have failed to achieve their objectives and in certain cases "may have had a negative impact on the OSCE's credibility" (Lewis, 2011: 103). Interestingly, the regime in Uzbekistan signed the MoU with OSCE to train its police force at a time when the country was under external pressure for an international investigation into the killings of protesters by the security forces in Andijan in 2005. The MoU also did not have any mention of human rights training, issues of democratic oversight or any reference to the involvement of civil society (Lewis, 2011: 109).⁴⁹ It reflects that the framework of cooperation under the capability pathway of the GWOt can be exploited by the fragile state to deflect external pressure. More controversially, some of the OSCE members were alleged to have been selling small arms and light weapons (SALW) destined for the ISIS. According to the reports, at least 68 cargo flights from four OSCE member states⁵⁰ have carried SALW to Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Jordan, destined for the Syrian rebels (The Guardian, 2016: BIRN & OCCRP, 2016).

The evidence hints at several consequences. First, the capability pathway of the GWOt feeds into the dynamics of regional amity/enmity, allowing the fragile states to use the demand for joining and cooperating in the fight against terrorism to isolate the (regional) rival. The external support in such context amplifies and (re)transmit the rivalry, instead of solving or containing it. Second, the juxtaposed actions by the OSCE at the individual as well as collective levels, and the legacy of its SSR programs in the authoritarian countries tend to suggest that the CT cooperation can also be used by the fragile states to deflect external pressure.

Third, it demonstrates that the external actors often remain happy with the willingness of the regime to cooperate in the GWoT, viewing it as a 'breakthrough' and ignoring that genuine transformation of the fragile states depends on the development of in-country state capacity.⁵¹ Indeed, the fragile states' willingness to join the GWoT can be a mere tactical concession to address internal insecurity dilemmas and deflecting external pressure, reducing such cooperation for the capacity building to a mere instrument for survival.

In sum, the capability pathway of the GWoT manifests itself through the exercise of coercion, the threat of coercion and capacity building assistance to fight international terrorism affecting the fragile states and its societies as depicted in figure 14. Through this pathway, the unable and unwilling fragile states are subjected to coercive actions, often in violation of the norm of sovereignty that can affect the domestic power structure, by ways of feeding resentments, creating group grievances, generating mistrust of the government that may spiral into questioning the legitimacy of the ruling regime and increase fragility. It also sets precedence for sovereignty norm violation, feeding regional instability and lack of trust, leading to militarization and arms race that drain out the fragile states' resources and thus preventing them from providing core services.

Again, the willingness of the fragile states to join the GWoT could also mean a mere tactical concession to deflect the external pressure and to secure external assistance and legitimacy. Faced with its own unique (in)security dilemma, the regimes in the fragile states often embark on optimizing the capability pathway of the GWoT to make new alliances to isolate the rival states that contributes to the regional polarization and the amplification of enmity. Domestically the coercive capacity is often used to strengthen regime security and elite control of the society. The discourse of the GWoT accord relative ease to the regime to divert the much-needed material resources, side-lining pressing issues. Thus, the structure of the GWoT in such a condition becomes a

necessary evil, and the coercive capability pathway becomes an instrument for furthering the regime interests and agendas.

Comparative Analysis of Cognitive, Regulatory and Capability Pathways


Despite their differences in the origins and channels of operation, all the three pathways can lead to the same types of outcome – an increase or decrease in state fragility. But how can we characterize the relationship and the relative importance of the three pathways?

The cognitive pathway is distinct from the regulatory pathway as the latter needs the state institutions to operate while the former can directly interact with society. It is inter-subjective in nature, highly contextual and it involves defining the 'us' and 'them'. An increasing trend in the regulatory and capability pathways (such as many countries conforming the global CT rules and increasing the CT capacity building) can only become meaningful when viewed through the cognitive pathways – i.e. who is the 'other' in a particular context? The cognitive pathway can mutate, to include, not only those who are globally proscribed as terrorists, but also those whom the regime wants to label as terrorist such as the opposition, minorities or groups in variance with the regime's ideology. Thus, one could argue that the cognitive pathway holds greater significance.

The motive of taking actions originates in the cognitive domain, the boundaries within which such actions will be performed is defined by the regulatory domain, and any action against terrorism cannot happen in a material vacuum – i.e. the capability domain. This, however, does not make the latter two pathways subordinate to the cognitive domain. For example, in 1972 the UNSG recognized that the "scope of terrorist activity had become increasingly international," creating a "climate of fear from which no one is immune" – a phenomenon that required collective action

(A/8791/Add.1). However, the idea for taking collective action remained dormant for over three decades. After the 9/11, it took only a few years for the global community to converge on the UN-based CT instruments, devise plans, strategies, technical guidance and, more importantly, providing financial and material assistance to fight terrorism, which is theorized as the regulatory and capability pathways. Thus, the three pathways are interdependent and their abilities to become relevant to effect change are determined by the tracks, along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interests of the powerful actors.

Figure 14: Capability Pathway of GWoT Affecting State Fragility



The interdependence among the agents of the cognitive, the regulatory and the capability pathways and their actions, as well as the positions they occupy in the system suggest two layers of relationship. The first layer involves the agents in the fragile states and the global actor(s), demanding the state to act and cooperate in a certain way to fight terrorism. The functioning of the three pathways at this layer is largely informed by the global discourse on terrorism, professed by the powerful actors at the loci of the international system. The states are required to take punitive actions, send reports, monitor the proscribed terrorist groups and their associates, as identified by the global institutions/powerful actors, or to face consequences. The second layer of the relationship is between the individual state and its society within which the capacity building and action against terrorism takes place. At this layer, the influence of the wider normative culture and practices are far from being in full agreement with the global norms. In an environment where the legitimacy of the government is low, and the process of decision making is not accountable and transparent, the global echo chamber and 'othering' (i.e. the cognitive pathway) may mutate to serve regime security.⁵² Endorsing the global CT regulations and norms, in such context, could simply be a part of the CT diplomacy to secure material help. Conversely, in an environment where the government is legitimate, transparent and accountable, the frictions created by the cognitive, regulatory and capability pathways of the GWoT can be resolved through a rule-based, participatory and transparent mechanism. In sum, there is a complex web of causal inter-relationship and interdependence amongst the three pathways and the legitimacy deficits are more crucial than the capacity deficits in the fragile states.

Conclusion

The theorization of the cognitive, regulatory and the capability pathways of the GWoT signifies that the state fragility is as much a matter of a global structure as it is of a state/societal agency. The

cognitive pathway creates a condition to (re)ignite and reinforce identity-based politics, shaping the minds of the states and societies in terms of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. It also creates a global echo chamber that empowers the fragile states to fight not only terrorism, but also selectively use the state’s coercive power to achieve regime security, instead of national security. The regulatory pathway of the GWoT creates demands to legislate, cooperate and coordinate actions against terrorism to achieve rule consistent behavior. It induces the fragile state to elevate CT as a national security threat. In the process of containing the threat of terrorism and conforming to the demand of the rule-consistent behavior, the fragile states often adopt broad and vague CT regulations that could be used not only against terrorism, but also against political opponents, insurgency, non-violent actions considered as a threat to the regime and not national security. Finally, dynamics of capability pathway of the GWoT can lead to increased/ decreased fragility, feed and amplify regional enmity and polarization. Thus, the process of arriving at fragility originates and survives due to the structure of the GWoT. The cognitive, regulatory and capability pathways of this global structure involve a crisscross process that originates in the international dimension and mediates through the states and their societies. While the intensity of the effects of these pathways of the GWoT is highly contextual, it is aptly evident that all of them can affect the capacity and legitimacy dimension of the fragile states.

Notes

1. President Bush’s era is regarded as a ‘war on terror presidency’. Subsequent U.S. presidents ‘bounded’, but not ended, the GWoT to a “series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists” (The White House, 2013). As Roach (2011:5) observes, “under President Obama, the extraordinary rendition program reportedly continues, and targeted killings of suspected terrorists have increased without the transparency and judicial review used in Israel.”
2. See A/8791/Add.1 for the statement by the UNSG flagging this problem in 1972. See Reuter (2006) and Horowitz (2015) for a critical historical account of the suicide terrorism. Roach (2011:3) examines the effect of 9/11 on global regulatory regime suggesting that the “differences between the responses of democracies and countries with poor human rights records to terrorism diminished in the wake of 9/11.”
3. Norris et.al. (2003), among others, argues that the event of 9/11 has led to the emergence of a new ‘macro frame’ of terrorism, with the propensity to link local events/conflicts with global ones. The implication and use of this new ‘macro frame’ on the governments, the non-state actors and the media has also been highlighted by others such as Reese (2007), Ruigrok and Van Atteveldt, (2007) and Ryan, (2004).
4. The argument is drawn from Entman (1993:52), one of the early proponent of ‘framing theory’, who states: “Frames, then, define problems – determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; diagnose causes – identify the forces creating the problem; make moral judgments – evaluate causal agents and their effects; and suggest remedies – offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects.”
5. According to the neoclassical realists, ‘policy elites’ can influence the foreign policy of the states’. However, others pay no attention to the domestic factors (Glenn, 2009:523–4; Rose, 1998; Wohlforth, 1993).
6. The realist claims that the distribution of material capabilities among states is the key factor for understanding world politics.
7. For example, regulatory pathway merges ‘power and interest’ of the international institutions and powerful actors with ‘ideas and norms’ (of social agency and process) and become effective with the material support. Together they create a shared meaning and ‘context’, within which the state and society act.

8. Writing immediately after 9/11, Will (2001) opined that the idea that an “extreme action can have justification in the social environment” is “bad sociology” and the idea that terrorism ‘can and should be eliminated by appeasement tarted up as reasonableness’ is ‘bad philosophy.’
9. As Ignatieff (2004) cautions, “the path of lesser evil is not ‘indefinite’, at some point – when we have to destroy the village in order to save it – we may conclude that we have slipped from the lesser to the greater (evil).”
10. Some states and prominent NGOs do not accept that non-state armed groups are subject to international human rights obligations (See A/HRC/34/61 21 February 2017, p.5)
11. The 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy outlines this doctrine in most clear terms: “the US can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past ... we cannot let our enemies strike first. As a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed” (White House, 2002: 14). However, the R2P document has not changed the legal position on intervention, which is based on three important principles: (i) international community has a responsibility to protect populations when their government doesn’t; (ii) the application of R2P is limited to situations of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing; (iii) the UNSC remains the gatekeeper to any such intervention.
12. For example, Fukuyama (2004) highlights that “the lack of governance in poor and troubled parts of the world ... could have profound security consequences” and warns against “excessive zeal in pursuing a society centric 'neo-liberal' agenda as it undermines state, calling for “bring back the state in.”
13. Dudouet (2011) points out that the proscriptions of actors in countries like Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Turkey, Palestine and Nepal took place at a time when they were demonstrating their

- readiness to engage in dialogue and considering non-violent political strategy, resulting in their re-radicalization.
14. Focusing on the state violence along three dimensions: scope, intensity and range, the PTS measures actual violations of physical integrity rights and political repression on a scale of 1 (countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, torture is rare or exceptional and the political murders are extremely rare) to 5 (countries where murders, disappearances, and torture are part of life and has been extended to the whole population).
 15. Percentage instead of absolute number of states is used as the total number of states varies.
 16. The magnitude score is based on a scale of 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) for each MEPV reflecting the destructive impact/magnitude of the episode on the directly affected society or societies. The magnitude scores are based on multiple factors including state capabilities, area and scope of death and destruction, population displacement, and episode duration. See Marshall (2016) for details.
 17. The total summed magnitudes of all societal MEPV (CIVTOT) includes country-year data on the magnitude score of episodes of ethnic warfare, ethnic violence, civil warfare and civil violence. Author recommends CIVTOT data as a more valid aggregate of societal violence (Marshall, 2017: 2).
 18. The meagre increase needs to be viewed in the context of restrictive methods applied to measure the magnitude of MEPV. Each MEVP reflects at least 500 ‘directly-related’ fatalities and the violence have to reach a level of intensity in which political violence is both systematic and sustained. For example, between 1946 and 2016, a magnitude 10 score in total societal violence (CIVTOT) has been assigned only on five occasions, the most recent one being the Rwandan genocide in 1994 (Marshall 2017).

19. There were only 19 occurrences of MEPVs with magnitude of 7-10 during this period out of which 16 were in India while one in Afghanistan and two in Angola.
20. Ratification include approval/acceptance/accession (i.e. approval after the treaty has entered into force)/ succession (i.e. successor new state continues to maintain approval of the convention), all of which bear the same legal effect as ratification. 'Ratification' as opposed to 'signature' of a global instrument reflects a tacit willingness and endorsement of a state and provides an insight into the 'mind' of a state. Many signatory states have never ratified a treaty.
21. Two post-9/11 CT conventions includes the 2005 convention on nuclear terrorism and 2010 convention of unlawful act on international civil aviation.
22. The UNSC Resolution 1368 (2001) in particular asked member states to 'redouble' their efforts, 'increase cooperation' and 'full implementation of the relevant international anti-terrorist conventions'.
23. The three-year interval corresponds to the average duration taken by the states for ratification.
24. The comparison is based on the same number of pre-9/11 HR conventions (N=10) available for ratifications since 1965. These are: 1965 Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), 1966 Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 1979 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CAT), 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Children (CRC), 1990 Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families

- (CMW), 1993 Convention on Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and 1998 ICC Statute.
25. The strategy is based on four pillars: (i) addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, (ii) measures to prevent and combat terrorism, (iii) measures to build states' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism (iv) measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism. In September 2008, all the 192-member states confirmed their commitment to the principles of this strategy and pledged to pursue its implementation.
26. A separate resolution on 'Human Rights and Terrorism' started from 1995.
27. Most of these resolutions were condemnations of terrorist attacks.
28. Chapter VII allows the UNSC to take obligatory form of action "with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression," rarely used against non-state actors in the past.³¹ Based on available country reports in the CTC website, and includes additional/revised/corrections submitted by the member states. The country reports beyond 2007 is not made public. Author's e-mail to obtain the post-2007 country reports for the case studies received no positive response from the CTC.
29. The resolution 1373 imposed 'formal obligations' on the states in the fight against international terrorism, and the task of raising "the average level of government performance against terrorism all over the world" (S/2004/70: 4).
30. Based on available country reports in the CTC website and includes additional/ revised/corrections submitted by the member states. The country reports beyond 2007 is not made public. Author's e-mail to obtain the post-2007 country reports

for the case studies received no positive response from the CTC.

31. Countries are: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Bosnia Herzegovina, Central African Republic, Congo D.R., Egypt, Indonesia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Libya, Mali, Malaysia Mauritania, Morocco, Netherland, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia (Chechnya), Switzerland, Sudan, Somalia Syria, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, UAE, USA, United Kingdom, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen
32. The CTC classify states into three prioritized stages. Stage A: requires ensuring the states to have effective CT legislation in all areas of activity related to resolution 1373; Stage B: requires strengthening the state's executive machinery for implementation of the CT legislation. The final stage is to mop-up outstanding areas of the Resolution (CTC 2003).
33. These includes reports like the CTED Global survey of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) by the Member States (S/2011/463; S/2016/49) the Human Rights Watch Report (2012), The European initiative for democracy and human rights report on 'Terrorism, counterterrorism and torture international law in the fight against terrorism' published by The Redress Trust.
34. The CTED Global Report observes such a shift of emphasis in the CT strategy from 'mitigating' impact, assisting victims, and restoring public order to develop and pursue 'preventive' capacity and measure considering the threats to national security (S/2016/49: 114).
35. The UN has issued technical guide to the implementation of the Security Council resolution 1373 (2001).
36. For example, Indonesia enacted its CT law within weeks of the Bali bombing in 2002 and wanted to apply the law

retroactively to the Bali incident, which was declared unconstitutional by Indonesia's Court (Roach 2010:10). The EU's CT agenda was also to a large extent 'crisis-driven', influenced by several major attacks: the 9/11, the Madrid and London bombings, the rise of the ISIS, the terrorist attacks in France in 2015, etc.

37. The state's compliance to the preventive provisions of the CT regulatory pathway are 'partial' (S/2016/49: 111).
38. The sovereignty principle is addressed in the U.S. Report on the legal and policy frameworks guiding the use of military force and related national security operations. It outlines the 'standards' for the U.S. military to conduct such interventions to ensure "respect for the sovereignty of other States" (The White House, 2016:10). However, the UN human rights commission notes that such (national) standards may lack international legitimacy, transparency and accountability (A/HRC/34/61, p. 12).
39. According to the ICRC (2013), "any weapon that makes it possible to carry out more precise attacks and helps avoid or minimise incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects, should be given preference over weapons that do not."
40. The thematic areas for legal contestation include the 'consent' of the host nation, purview of drone attack in 'self-defense' against an 'unable or unwilling' state and defining the 'imminence' of the threat. The host nation's consent to the drone strikes often bypass the legitimate channel. There is strong evidence to suggest that the Pakistan military and some government officials were 'quietly acquiesced' about the U.S. drone strikes in Federally Administered Tribal Areas between 2004 and 2008. After such revelations, Pakistan's parliament adopted revised terms that restricts the government or any of its component entities to lawfully enter into verbal agreements with any foreign government or authority allowing drone

- strikes inside Pakistani territory (BBC, 2013; The Dawn 2016, A/68/389, p.15)
41. The respondents opined that the drone attacks kill too many innocent people. Some, however, suggest that the “drone blowback in Pakistan is a myth.” (Shah, 2016).
 42. The data is from the SIPRI (2017) while the military expenditure database expressed in constant (2014) US\$ m and has several missing data on the fragile states.
 43. The data is from the US Overseas Loans & Grants 2016 in terms of ‘obligations’ (Constant 2015 \$US).
 44. The formula for the Compound Annual Growth Rate is $((\text{End Value}/\text{Start Value})^{(1/\text{Periods})} - 1)$.
 45. The 34-nation Islamic counter terrorism coalition includes Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Palestinians, Qatar, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
 46. Saudi Arabia has long expressed concern over the Iranian influence in the region, evidenced by the mention of the Iranian ‘occupation’ of three islands: The Greater and the Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa belonging to the United Arab Emirates in several GCC Final Communiqué (GCC, 1998, 2009).
 47. The exercise was arranged under the 2014 Military Cooperation Pact. The Russian president stated that “it [the exercise] is good for India because of their anti-terror focus” (The Dawn, 2016a, 2016b).
 48. The Bishkek declaration in December 2001 triggered the SSR initiatives by the OSCE. The countries included Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.
 49. The OSCE’s assistance for the SSR in the authoritarian regimes was particularly difficult in absence of any “parallel process of political democratization.” The complex relationship between the state security forces and the organized crime also pose additional challenge (Lewis 2011: 103-05).
 50. The countries include Serbia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Czech Republic.
 51. Lewis (2011:117) conclusion is based on Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. However, a ‘narrow’ definition for external aid/assistance delivery may also originate from the donor end. For example, the UK’s overseas aid through the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) and the Prosperity Fund is led by the National Security Council (NSC), instead of the DFID. This has raised doubts whether NSC will prioritize poverty reduction over a narrow definition of the national interest, making its accountability and transparency a matter of concern (House of Commons 2016: 16).
 52. As Elder-Vass (2015: 166) highlights, an organization may draw on wider social culture by adopting practices and values, such as, honesty, working hard, punctuality and politeness; yet in cultures that encourage nepotism or corruption, the same organization may well undermine the purposes or functioning of the organization.

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