Journal Abstract

A structural mismatch between ministerial authority and sectoral expertise persistently constrains Bangladesh's governance performance in technically complex sectors. Within the Westminster parliamentary tradition, ministers are selected primarily for electoral success and party loyalty yet are tasked with directing highly specialized domains such as health, aviation, energy, transport, and education. This article claims that current solutions—temporary appointments of experts and parliamentary committees—are not enough because they do not have electoral support, job security, or accountability based on performance. Based on bounded technocracy theory and Bangladesh's constitution, the article suggests a dual-mandate parliamentary system that keeps full constituency representation while adding a small number of sector-based Members of Parliament elected nationally to head specific ministries. Sector ministers would be accountable through transparent, portfolio-specific performance indicators and strengthened committee oversight. The suggested model includes expert knowledge in the democratic process instead of ignoring it, providing a practical way to enhance governance in specific areas while maintaining the power of Parliament, political responsibility, and democratic trust in Bangladesh.