Journal Reference

Boix, C. 1998. Political Parties, Growth and Equality:
Conservative and Social Democratic Economic Strategies in the
World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Bowles, S., H. Gintis and B. Gustafsson (1993). Markets and
Democracy: Participation, Accountability and Efficiency.
Cambridge University Press.
Cameron, R. E. (1993). A Concise Economic History of the World:
From Paleolithic Times to the Present. Oxford University Press.
Diamond, L. (1995). ‘Democracy and economic reform: Tensions,
compatibilities, and strategies for reconciliation,’ in E. Lazear ed.,
Economic Transition in Eastern Europe and Russia: Realities of
Reform (pp. 107-158). Hoover Institution Press.
Diamond, L. (1999). Developing Democracy: Toward
Consolidation. JHU Press.
Fujita, M. and D. Hu (2001). ‘Regional disparity in China
1985–1994: the effects of globalization and economic
liberalization,’ The Annals of Regional Science 35(1): 3- 37.
Garrett, G. and D. Mitchell (2001). ‘Globalization, government
spending and taxation in the OECD,’ European Journal of
Political Research 39(2): 145-177.
Gill, S. (1995). ‘Globalisation, market civilisation, and disciplinary
neoliberalism,’ Millennium Journal of International Studies
24(3): 399-423.
Goldberg, P. K. and N. Pavcnik (2007). ‘Distributional effects of
globalization in developing countries’ (No. w12885). National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Haggard, S. and R.R. Kaufman (1995). The Political Economy of
Democratic Transitions. Princeton University Press.
Hallowell, J. H. (1954). The Moral Foundation of Democracy.
University of Chicago Press.
Held, D. (1991). ‘Democracy, the nation-state and the global
system,’ International Journal of Human Resource Management
20(2): 138-172.
Held, D. (1992). ‘Democracy: From city-states to a cosmopolitan
order?,’ Political Studies 40(s1): 10-39.
Held, D. (1999). Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and
Culture. Stanford University Press.
Hosmer Jr, D. W., & Lemeshow, S. (2004). Applied logistic
regression. John Wiley & Sons.
Huntington, S. P. (1993). The Third Wave: Democratization in
The Late Twentieth Century (Vol. 4). University of Oklahoma
press.
Im, H. B. (1996). ‘Globalisation and democratisation: Boon
companions or strange bedfellows?,’ Australian Journal of
International Affairs 50(3): 279-291.
Jaccard, J. (2001). Interaction Effects in Logistic Regression (Vol.
135). Sage.
Jackman, S. (2000). ‘Estimation and inference are missing data
problems: Unifying social science statistics via Bayesian
simulation,’ Political Analysis 8(4): 307-332.
Keohane, R.O. and H.V. Milner (1996). Internationalization and
Domestic Politics. Cambridge University Press.
King, G. and R.X. Browning (1987). ‘Democratic representation
and partisan bias incongressional elections,’ American Political
Science Review 81(04): 1251-1273.
Li, Q. and R. Reuveny (2003). ‘Economic globalization and
democracy: An empirical analysis,’ British Journal of Political
Science 33(1): 29-54.
Lindblom, C. E. and P.H. Bimbaum (1979). ‘Politics and markets:
The world's political-economic systems,’ Business Horizons 22(5):
80-81.
Lipset, S. M. (1994). ‘The social requisites of democracy revisited:
1993 presidential address,’ American Sociological Review 59 (1):
1-22.
Mann, M. (1970). ‘The social cohesion of liberal democracy,’
American Sociological Review 35 (3): 423-439.
Menard, S. (2009). Logistic Regression: From Introductory to
Advanced Concepts and Applications. Sage Publications.
O’Donnell, G. and P.C. Schmitter (2013). Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain
Democracies. JHU Press.
O'Donell, G. A. (1994). ‘Delegative democracy,’ Journal of
Democracy, 5(1): 55-69.
Pampel, F. C. (2000). Logistic Regression: A Primer (Vol. 132).
Sage.
Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the Market: Political and
Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America.
Cambridge University Press.
Robertson, R. (1992). Globalization: Social Theory and Global
Culture (Vol. 16). Sage.
Schumpeter, J. A. (2013). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.
Harper and Row, Routledge.
Svensson, P. and J. Elklit (1997). ‘What makes elections free and
fair?,’ Journal of Democracy 8(3): 32-46.
Teorell, J., S. Dahlberg, S. Holmberg, B. Rothstein, F. Hartmann
and R. Svensson (2015). The Quality of Government Standard
Dataset, version Jan15. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of
Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se.
Wallerstein, I. (2011). The Modern World-System I: Capitalist
Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in
the Sixteenth Century, with a New Prologue (Vol. 1). University of
California Press.
About the Author
Md. Mujahedul Islam is a doctoral scholar in the Department of
Political Science at the University of Toronto. He can be reached at
[email protected]
Siege, Resistance, and Politics in 'New Kashmir'
Mohd Tahir Ganie
Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland
Abstract
In August 2019, the populist Modi government, after getting
re-elected in a massive landslide, rescinded the semi-autonomous
status (constitutionally guaranteed under Article 370) of the
disputed Muslim-majority region of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K)
by putting its 12 million residents under an unprecedented
lockdown. This article will examine the ramifications of this
decision, which earned praise in mainland India but generated
anger and fear among the people of J&K, especially in the Kashmir
Valley, the epicenter of the Kashmiri self-determination
movement? It situates the prior measures Indian government took
to impose its decision on the population which strongly opposed it
and assesses the human cost of this imposition. It looks at the
international community’s response to the political and human
rights crisis obtained due to the siege imposed on the people of the
contested Himalayan region. And, finally, the article indicates that
the political future of Kashmir, which has been the main source of
intense geopolitical rivalry between two nuclear-armed South
Asian neighbors (India and Pakistan), and a site of protracted
armed conflict and unarmed anti-India resistance, is likely to
remain caught in a cycle of relative calm and unrest that has
marked its modern history.
Keywords: Article 370, Modi government, Kashmir siege, Jammu
and Kashmir, human rights crisis, lockdown, Kashmiri resistance,
Naya Kashmir.
172 I Islam Democratic Institutions and Elections I 173
Globalization, Democratic Institutions and
The Fairness of the Elections
Md. Mujahedul Islam
University of Toronto
Abstract
A central normative argument of liberal democracy is that
elections as instruments of democracy need to be free, fair and
neutral to reflect peoples’ opinions. In many parts of the world,
particularly democracies in developing countries of South Asia and
Africa, governments are formed by elections that are sometimes
considered 'flawed' by the people and international observers. This
raises a critical question with far-reaching implications for
democracy: What affects the fairness of the elections? Is there any
significant direct effect of globalization on elections? If not, under
what circumstances does globalization influence the quality of
elections? Do effective political institutions condition the effect of
globalization on the fairness of the elections? I empirically assess
these questions from 2006 to 2010 for 100 countries in a
time-series cross-sectional statistical model using the 2015 Quality
of Government (QoG) dataset. The results suggest that greater
levels of globalization significantly increase the fairness of the
elections in countries where effective political institutions exist.
The results furthermore demonstrate that in the absence of viable
democratic institutions, an increased level of globalization may
not always correspond to free, fair and neutral elections.
Introduction
One line of argument among political scientists has stressed that
globalization promotes democracy by disseminating democratic
values across countries. In response to this argument, world
democratic leaders aim to formulate policies that promote greater
political, economic, cultural and social liberalization particularly
in countries that lack a minimal commitment to democratic values.
Another argument suggests that globalization weakens country's
domestic actors whether it is political, social, economic and
cultural and thereby makes a country more and more reliant upon
foreign countries. In line with this argument, protectionists aim to
resist almost all aspects of globalization.
These two schools of thought, therefore, either examine the
positive or negative effects of globalization on democratization or
on countries’ economy and lack systematic analysis to identify
whether globalization has a conditioning effect on the fairness of
the elections. Against this backdrop, this paper asks the central
question: Is the effect of globalization on elections conditioned by
institutional settings of a country? More specifically, do effective
democratic institutions condition the effect of globalization on the
fairness of the elections?
These research questions are significant to examine for at least two
reasons. First, elections are central means for acquiring legitimate
political power and for democratization (Hallowell, 1954; King &
Browning, 1987) and if the elections are flawed and are not
domestically and internationally recognized as free, fair and
neutral elections, democracy is more likely to dysfunction and
divide the people (Svensson & Elklit, 1997).
This paper operationalizes ‘fair and free elections’, the dependent
variable of the study, in line with the definition offered by
Svensson and Elklit (1997) who argued the elections can be
characterized as free and fair by the overall perception of people
and international observers, even if they are not perfect. It then
operationalizes globalization, the key independent variable, as the
integration or interconnectedness of open economic, liberal
political and progressive social aspects into a country.
Analyzing the QoG standard dataset from 2006 to 2010, this paper
finds that greater globalization is positively and significantly
associated with the quality of elections. This paper is structured as
follows. Firstly, it reviews the state of literatures regarding the
effects of globalization on democracy and elections and formulates
empirically testable hypotheses. It then discusses data and
explains outcome variable and key explanatory variable and other
controlled variables. After that, it proceeds to analyze the data and
discusses the key findings from the analysis. Finally, the finding
suggests that countries with ineffective political institutions may
not reap the positive effects of globalization on elections for as
much as the countries with effective political institutions: the
degree of globalization is positively and significantly associated
with the fairness of the elections when countries are equipped with
effective democratic institutions.
Theoretical Considerations and
Hypotheses Formulation
One of the widely discussed topics in the literature of political
science and political economy is the topic of globalization, election
and democracy (Haggard & Kaufman, 1995). Most scholars on this
field define globalization at the minimum as countries which are
more integrated into world economies, with mounting information
flows among them that, in turn, means greater trade and financial
openness. Increasing information flows mean, possibly, cultural
union across countries. Most scholars also agree that democracy
implies a national political regime based on free elections and
broad political representation (Wallerstein, 2011; Cameron, 1993;
Held, 1999; Huntington, 1993; Diamond, 1999). What fair and free
election means also raises scholarly debate. This paper, therefore,
operationalizes fair election based on argument of Svensson and
Elklit (1997) who argued the elections can be characterized as free
and fair by the overall perception of people and international
observers, even if they are not perfect. This paper operationalizes
globalization as the integration of open economic, liberal political
and progressive social aspects into a country.
Interestingly, though there are widespread literature on the effects
of globalization on democracy, there is little empirical examination
that aims to find out the conditioning effects of globalization on
the fairness of elections based on the effectiveness of political
institutions. In their synthesis of several case studies, O’Donnell,
and Schmitter (2013), for instance, conclude that the effect of
international factors (globalization) on democracy is indirect and
marginal. A significant number of literature, on the other hand,
argues that globalization promotes democracy by encouraging
economic development. The notion that free markets ease
democracy can be found to the late eighteenth century. In this
view, globalization facilitates economic growth, augments the
magnitudes of the middle class, rises education and lowers income
inequality, all of which are core elements to foster democracy
(Lipset, 1994). It further argues that trade, and foreign direct
investments (FDI) allocate resources to their most efficient use;
democracy is said to distribute political power to its most
competent use. The outcome in both cases represents the free will
of individuals and thus advancement of democracy (Schumpeter,
2013; Held, 1992; Bowles et al., 1993; Lipset, 1994; Im, 1996).
Another line of research, on the other hand, argues globalization
trims down the policy autonomy of state and results in public
policies that satisfy foreign investors in lieu of the common people.
It furthermore argues that one of the inevitable effects of
globalization is deepened ethnic and class cleavages and
diminished national-cultural basis of democracy (Lindblom &
Bimbaum, 1979; Held, 1991; Diamond, 1995; Gill, 1995;
Robertson, 1992; Keohane & Milner, 1996). Garrett and Mitchell
(2001) similarly assess the impact of globalization on welfare state
effort in the OECD and found that globalization induced cuts in
welfare countries. Using pooled time-series cross-sectional data
for 127 countries from 1970 to 1996, Li and Reuveny (2003) found
that trade openness and portfolio investment inflows negatively
affect democracy.
Some scholars, on the contrary, focus on a specific region to
estimate the effect of globalization (Przeworski, 1991; Goldberg &
Pavcnik, 2007; Boix, 1998; Fujita & Hu, 2001). Thus, although a
large number of literature argues for both positive and negative
effects of globalization on democracy, tax, welfare spending, there
is a noticeable gap in the literature in respect to finding out
whether the effects of globalization on the fairness of elections vary
depending on the nature of political institutions. Thus, based on
the above literatures, this paper formulates the following two
empirically testable hypotheses:
H1. ‘An increased level of globalization may not
always correspond to free, fair and neutral
elections’
H2. ‘An increased level of globalization may
correspond to the fairness of elections when
effective democratic institutions exist in a
country’
Data, Variables and Methods.
SELECTION OF THE SAMPLE
This paper uses the Quality of Government (QoG) Standard
dataset 2015. Although the original dataset contains 14559
observations for more than 190 countries from 1946 to 2014, it
reduces to 278 (14062 observations deleted) as soon as the study
restricts its analysis only to elections year and the fairness of the
election variables. The unit of analysis is thus whether the
elections in a particular year were considered free and fair by the
people and international observers.
For the analysis, I removed missing information from the key
variable of interest which is the 'level of globalization'. I
furthermore removed respondents with missing information on
controlled variables which are 'separation of power', 'effectiveness
of democratic institutions' and 'social cohesion', among many
others. After processing data, the total sample size of this study
dropped to 278. Although the sample size is parsimonious, it
should have still inferential statistical power as we removed
missing observations and has observation more than two hundred
for some cases like elections (Jackman, 2000).
This paper employs binary logistic regression models (see e.g.,
Menard, 2009; Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2004; Pampel, 2000) where
results are presented in terms of odds ratios and predicted
probabilities (at the means of the other covariates). The empirical
analysis follows two steps where the first step uses binary logistic
regression and controls key independent variable and other
controlled variables, and the second step employs an interaction
model (Jaccard, 2001) as the study presumes that the effect of
globalization on the fairness of the elections will vary depending
on the levels of effectiveness of political institutions (H2).
DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES.
Dependent variable. The dependent variable measures whether
the general election was considered as 'free and fair' (originally
called bti_ffe in QoG dataset). More precisely, it measures whether
“political representatives were determined by general, free and fair
elections” (Teorell et.al., 2015). Originally, the variable was coded
based on 10 categories where each category detects different level
of restrictions on the fairness of the elections. The variable is coded
as such that until the 8th category there were incidences of serious
irregularities that include, but not limited to, restrictions on
candidates, ballot count, voting process, or voters’ freedom.
Hence, I merged these categories together and coded them as ‘not
fair’ elections. The categories 9 and 10, on the other hand, captured
no major constraints and thus political representatives in these
cases were determined by fair elections. Therefore, I have merged
the categories 9 and 10. Finally, this resulted in a binary outcome
variable where the value of ‘1’ was assigned if political
representatives were determined by free and fair elections and ‘0
otherwise.
Independent variable. This paper identifies the globalization
index (originally called dr_ig in QoG dataset) as the key
independent variable. KOF Index of Globalization measures the
three main dimensions of globalization: economic, social and
political. As a continuous variable, the index range between 0 and
100, where higher values indicate a higher degree of globalization.
Economic globalization (originally called dr_eg in QoG dataset) is
defined as the long-distance flows of goods, capital and services as
well as information and perceptions that accompany market
exchanges. It is measured by actual flows of trade and investments,
and by restrictions on trade and capital such as tariff rates.
Political globalization (originally called dr_pg in QoG dataset) is
measured by the number of embassies and high commissions in a
country, the number of international organizations of which the
country is a member. And finally, social globalization (originally
called dr_sg in QoG dataset) is measured by three categories of
indicators. The first is personal contacts, such as telephone traffic
and tourism. The second is information flows, e.g. number of
Internet users. The third is cultural proximity, e.g., trade in books
and number of warehouses per capita. The overall index of
globalization is thus the weighted average of economic, social and
political globalization where most weight has been given to
economic followed by social globalization.
The summary statistics of the covariates is presented in Table 1.
Descriptively, for the outcome variable ‘0’ the table demonstrates
that 36% (.36) of the elections was free and fair whereas 64%
(1-.36) of the elections was flawed and suffered from irregularities.
The key explanatory variable of the index of globalization, as the
Table 1 and the Figure 1 demonstrate, is approximately normally
distributed where the range of the globalization score is between
28 to 89 meaning that there are some countries that are
inadequately globalized while others are highly globalized. As the
Figure 1 shows,
most of the countries are, however, moderately globalized with a
score between 50 to 70.
Controlled covariates. In line with literature, I controlled some
important covariates i.e., separation of powers (Svensson & Elklit,
1997), effectiveness of democratic institutions (O'Donell, 1994),
and social cohesion (Mann, 1970). Separation of power (originally
called bti_sop in QoG dataset) measures the extent to which a
working separation of powers (checks and balances) exists in a
country from 1 to 10 scale? Until scale 7 it codes some sort of major
problems with separation of power like control of judiciary by the
executive body and therefore coded as 0. Scale 7 to 10 captures that
separation of powers generally is in place and functioning with
mutual checks and balances and therefore coded as 1.
Effectiveness of democratic institutions variable (originally called
bti_pdi in QoG dataset) measures whether democratic institutions
capable of performing effectively and neutrally on a 1-10 scale with
high scores implying democratic institutions are doing better. This
study merges 8, 9 and 10 together and coded it as 1 as it captures
that democratic institutions are well effective and political
decisions are prepared, made, implemented and reviewed in
legitimate procedures by the appropriate authorities. A value of 0
was given to all other categories as it captures that democratic
institutions are not effective.
Finally, the social cohesion is a continuous variable where higher
number means a more cohesive society and less ethnic fraction.
The size of government (originally called fi_sog in QoG dataset)
ranges from 0-10 where 0 means large general government
consumption, large transfer sector and many government
enterprises and 10 means small general government consumption,
small transfer sector and few government enterprises. The margin
of victory variable (originally called dpi_maj in QoG dataset)
captures the fraction of seats held by the government and is
estimated by dividing the number of government seats by total
(government plus opposition plus non-aligned) seats (Teorell
et.al., 2015). The developing countries variable groups the
countries based on whether they fall under the category of
developing countries or not according to the U.S. Agency for
International Development.1
Empirical specifications I present the stylized facts on the relation
between globalization and the fairness of the elections. To this end,
I employ two main empirical specifications that take the following
generic forms. The first model tests H1 while the second model
tests H2.
where ln = means the odds of being an election free and fair. P
x=1 simply means the elections that were free over flawed election
denoted as 1−P(x). β0 is constant and the average effect on the
fairness of the elections when all the covariates are set to zero and
εi is the error term. This paper, however, presents the results in
Table 2 in forms of coefficient, rather than odds ratio for an easy
interpretation.
Empirical Results and Discussion
Table 2 examines the impact of globalization on the fairness of the
elections. Model 1 presents a bivariate relationship between the
levels of globalization and the fairness of the elections without
controls whereas Model 2 presents the findings of a multivariate
logistic regression with nine different controls. Finally, Model 3
demonstrates the effects of globalization on the fairness of the
elections with an interaction model.
Importantly, whereas the simple bivariate analysis indicates a
significant positive effects of globalization on free and fair
elections, controlling for the effectiveness of democratic
institutions, separation of power and ethnic homogeneity, among
many others, suggests an increased level of globalization may not
always directly correspond to free, fair and neutral elections. Thus,
the results from the binary logistic regression shown in Model 2
confirm the H1 and substantively suggest that greater
globalization levels may not always be positively associated with
holding free and fair elections as the t-value is 0.8 which is less
than the conventional cut off of 1.96 at 95% confidence level.
It is also important to report that effective democratic institutions
when compared with flawed democratic institutions may
significantly correspond to the fairness of the elections as shown in
Model 2 and 3. Once this study finds that levels of globalization
does not have a significant effect on the fairness of the elections in
a multivariate regression models, it runs an interaction model of
globalization with the effectiveness of democratic institutions
variable to empirically test the H2, which is whether an increased
level of globalization may correspond to the fairness of elections
when effective democratic institutions exist in a country.
The interaction of effective democratic institutions with the
different levels of globalization, as included in the Model 3 of Table
2, suggests a statistically significant positive effects on the fairness
of elections. To visually demonstrate the effects of different levels
of globalization when interacted with effectiveness of political
institutions, this study furthermore runs a predicted probability
analysis holding all other control variables at constant. The results,
as shown in Figure 2, furthermore confirm H2 demonstrating that
the predicted probabilities of holding fair, free and neutral
elections increase with an increase in the globalization index under
the condition that the globalization is accompanied by effective
democratic institutions.
Conclusion
The vast body of globalization literature provides mixed evidence
about the effects of globalization on elections and democracy. This
paper empirically examines whether an increased level of
globalization may directly correspond to free, fair and neutral
elections and finds no evidence regarding the direct effect in a
multivariate regression model. More specifically, whereas the
simple bivariate analysis indicates a significant positive effects of
globalization on free and fair elections, controlling for the
effectiveness of democratic institutions, separation of power and
ethnic homogeneity, among many others, suggests an increased
level of globalization may not always directly correspond to free,
fair and neutral elections. However, this paper presents an
interaction effect of globalization suggesting that an increased
level of globalization may correspond to the fairness of elections
when effective democratic institutions exist in a country. It also
finds that the predicted probabilities of holding free, fair and
neutral elections significantly increase as countries globalize and
ensure the effectiveness of its democratic institutions. However,
there are some important limitations of the findings particularly as
it is based on small sample size. Besides, due to data limitation, it
has observation at the election level only for a few years. Hence,
future research can be carried out with the similar substantive area
with different specifications with a larger sample size to check the
robustness of this finding. The finding, however, has a
far-reaching implication for democracy: it suggests that greater
levels of globalization significantly increase the fairness of the
elections when countries have effective political institutions. In the
absence of viable political institutions, an increased level of
globalization may not always correspond to free, fair and neutral
elections.
Note
1. The list of developing countries can be retrieved at
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1876/3
10maa.pdf
References
Boix, C. 1998. Political Parties, Growth and Equality:
Conservative and Social Democratic Economic Strategies in the
World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Bowles, S., H. Gintis and B. Gustafsson (1993). Markets and
Democracy: Participation, Accountability and Efficiency.
Cambridge University Press.
Cameron, R. E. (1993). A Concise Economic History of the World:
From Paleolithic Times to the Present. Oxford University Press.
Diamond, L. (1995). ‘Democracy and economic reform: Tensions,
compatibilities, and strategies for reconciliation,’ in E. Lazear ed.,
Economic Transition in Eastern Europe and Russia: Realities of
Reform (pp. 107-158). Hoover Institution Press.
Diamond, L. (1999). Developing Democracy: Toward
Consolidation. JHU Press.
Fujita, M. and D. Hu (2001). ‘Regional disparity in China
1985–1994: the effects of globalization and economic
liberalization,’ The Annals of Regional Science 35(1): 3- 37.
Garrett, G. and D. Mitchell (2001). ‘Globalization, government
spending and taxation in the OECD,’ European Journal of
Political Research 39(2): 145-177.
Gill, S. (1995). ‘Globalisation, market civilisation, and disciplinary
neoliberalism,’ Millennium Journal of International Studies
24(3): 399-423.
Goldberg, P. K. and N. Pavcnik (2007). ‘Distributional effects of
globalization in developing countries’ (No. w12885). National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Haggard, S. and R.R. Kaufman (1995). The Political Economy of
Democratic Transitions. Princeton University Press.
Hallowell, J. H. (1954). The Moral Foundation of Democracy.
University of Chicago Press.
Held, D. (1991). ‘Democracy, the nation-state and the global
system,’ International Journal of Human Resource Management
20(2): 138-172.
Held, D. (1992). ‘Democracy: From city-states to a cosmopolitan
order?,’ Political Studies 40(s1): 10-39.
Held, D. (1999). Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and
Culture. Stanford University Press.
Hosmer Jr, D. W., & Lemeshow, S. (2004). Applied logistic
regression. John Wiley & Sons.
Huntington, S. P. (1993). The Third Wave: Democratization in
The Late Twentieth Century (Vol. 4). University of Oklahoma
press.
Im, H. B. (1996). ‘Globalisation and democratisation: Boon
companions or strange bedfellows?,’ Australian Journal of
International Affairs 50(3): 279-291.
Jaccard, J. (2001). Interaction Effects in Logistic Regression (Vol.
135). Sage.
Jackman, S. (2000). ‘Estimation and inference are missing data
problems: Unifying social science statistics via Bayesian
simulation,’ Political Analysis 8(4): 307-332.
Keohane, R.O. and H.V. Milner (1996). Internationalization and
Domestic Politics. Cambridge University Press.
King, G. and R.X. Browning (1987). ‘Democratic representation
and partisan bias incongressional elections,’ American Political
Science Review 81(04): 1251-1273.
Li, Q. and R. Reuveny (2003). ‘Economic globalization and
democracy: An empirical analysis,’ British Journal of Political
Science 33(1): 29-54.
Lindblom, C. E. and P.H. Bimbaum (1979). ‘Politics and markets:
The world's political-economic systems,’ Business Horizons 22(5):
80-81.
Lipset, S. M. (1994). ‘The social requisites of democracy revisited:
1993 presidential address,’ American Sociological Review 59 (1):
1-22.
Mann, M. (1970). ‘The social cohesion of liberal democracy,’
American Sociological Review 35 (3): 423-439.
Menard, S. (2009). Logistic Regression: From Introductory to
Advanced Concepts and Applications. Sage Publications.
O’Donnell, G. and P.C. Schmitter (2013). Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain
Democracies. JHU Press.
O'Donell, G. A. (1994). ‘Delegative democracy,’ Journal of
Democracy, 5(1): 55-69.
Pampel, F. C. (2000). Logistic Regression: A Primer (Vol. 132).
Sage.
Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the Market: Political and
Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America.
Cambridge University Press.
Robertson, R. (1992). Globalization: Social Theory and Global
Culture (Vol. 16). Sage.
Schumpeter, J. A. (2013). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.
Harper and Row, Routledge.
Svensson, P. and J. Elklit (1997). ‘What makes elections free and
fair?,’ Journal of Democracy 8(3): 32-46.
Teorell, J., S. Dahlberg, S. Holmberg, B. Rothstein, F. Hartmann
and R. Svensson (2015). The Quality of Government Standard
Dataset, version Jan15. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of
Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se.
Wallerstein, I. (2011). The Modern World-System I: Capitalist
Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in
the Sixteenth Century, with a New Prologue (Vol. 1). University of
California Press.